Unlike their luckier neighbors to the west, Ukraine and Moldova did not enjoy a convenient geographical location, a national consensus, a clear identity or the state traditions to make their transition effective after the meltdown of the Soviet empire. Their initial transformation was gradual, with leaders at the helm inherited from the communist past. Thus began an evolution, in many ways similar to that of many other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, that led to an oligarchic but pluralistic Ukrainian and a captured oligarchic Moldovan state. So far, reform efforts have not been successful, demonstrating the strength of the new systems that came into being. In Ukraine two revolutions aimed at radical reforms but the first one failed and so far the second did not deliver the kind of liberal state that demonstrators and Western partners expected alike. The case of Moldova is similar but here mistakes of the Western partners also contributed to the current, unreformed outcome. Increasingly, the issue centers around the rule-of-law, the establishment of a competent and independent judiciary -in a geopolitical space that could not be further away from what Luttwak 26 years ago imagined with his description of a transition to geoeconomics. In large parts of the world, including Eastern Europe, bad old traditional geopolitics is very much alive and shapes everyday life in the most dramatic way.
Introduction
Both, Ukraine and Moldova have fallen in the last couple of years into deep governanceinduced political crisis. In both countries, the governing elite is continuing to govern in The paradox that the Soviet period saw the growth of a national intelligentsia exists in both countries. However, whereas in Ukraine it was a Ukrainian intelligentsia, in Moldova the "Moldovanist" ideology was identified with the Soviet Union, and it thus came to be discredited in the eyes of many (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 97) . On the other hand, "Ukrainian" meant quite different things to different parts of the country. In what in Ukraine is called "Galicia" (or indeed Eastern Galicia) a strong ethnic Ukrainian national identity is accompanied with the Greek Catholic religion, distinct from the Russian Orthodox Church (and also from Catholicism further West, as the Greek Catholics pledge allegiance to Rome but maintain an orthodox ritual). In the central parts of Ukraine the Ukrainian identity is more fluid, stretching from traditional village Ukrainianness to a large town identity shaped in the Soviet past. While in the West the Ukrainian language is nearly universal, in central Ukraine's large towns Ukrainian identity may well be accompanied with the dominance of the Russian language, and in villages with the use of "surzhik:" a regionally changing combination of Russian and Ukrainian. In general there is a very significant difference between the way World War 2 is interpreted through the filter of the "Soviet-rooted" Ukrainian identity and the more ethnic type, primarily in Galicia. Until very recently an almost religious version of a "heroic Soviet" identity prevailed in most parts of the country that were parts of the Soviet Union by the outbreak of the war. On the other hand, in the three West Ukrainian counties the ethnic version of the Ukrainian consciousness kept alive the mythology about the fiercely nationalistic Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and its political predecessor, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Since the OUN and UPA had extremist and fascistic elements, the two narratives, while both distortive, have been highly conflicting. Reconciling the two Ukrainian patriotic narratives is a true challenge not particularly eased by the large Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the US that predominantly come from a very ethno-nationalistic West Ukrainian background.
Elite continuity in the early period of independence
In marked contrast to Estonia and Latvia (less so but still, to Lithuania) 4 , early elections left the Communist elites largely intact and in dominant position in the economy and in important state functions in both countries. This is, then, the identity background of the state and economy-building that started in the two countries in 1991-2, as the Soviet Union unexpectedly melted away.
This had major and lasting impact on what kind of state and economy they built from the local ruins of the Soviet Union. And ruins they were, as the old Soviet integration patterns evaporated together with the Soviet Union. Much of the Soviet industry was rendered uncompetitive on the world markets while within the former Soviet Union simultaneous collapse and a shrinking economy reduced demand for each other's products. These countries were also less lucky geographically than most of the former Central-East
European satellites of the Soviet Union. For Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, while it was not easy, it was more feasible to find Western markets to replace earlier Soviet demand than for Moldova and Ukraine, that were geographically much more isolated from them. Thus the challenge of economic reform was certainly more momentous.
These post-communist elites also lacked the kind of understanding of the "Western" alternative economic models that their colleagues in Central Europe already understood much better.
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While in the Central European and the Baltic countries (with the exception until 1998 of Slovakia) there was a determined move towards an economic and social system compatible with that of the European countries, on the basis of the consensus wish to become integrated in both the EU and NATO, this consensus as well as the reforms towards the Western model were absent in Ukraine and largely absent also in Moldova.
One also needs to understand that the EU and NATO became interested in these formerly With Kravchuk's successor, Kuchma, the swings started between reform and oligarchic expansion. Kuchma, whose background was in the senior management of the military industry, had to first handle the economic crisis that Kravchuk left behind. He needed the IMF for this, and thus he pledged reforms. 6 However, as soon as the country seemed off the hook, already in 1995, the reform-willingness dropped. 7 In the pro-reform period macroeconomic consolidation and the successful introduction of the national currency were among the lasting results.
In the first years of lawlessness criminality spread and played an active role in the original accumulation of capital. The main sources of capital accumulation at the time were "security" and "insurance" payments to gangs as well as the more "white collar"
acquisitions of monopoly trading rights in the field of energy -particularly in the field of energy imports from Russia. Industry collapsed but the privatization that could have saved some of the industry did not take off until 2000, after Kuchma appointed
Yushchenko as prime minister -in reaction to yet another crisis.
The second short-lived reform period happened in both countries after the Russian financial crisis that dashed the nascent post-Soviet recovery hopes in 1998. In Moldova its lack of radicalism and comprehensiveness in reform led to massive dissatisfaction and Voronin also had to change the ideology gradually, as back to the future was neither feasible nor desirable to him once he had the presidential power. He got gradually convinced that large scale renationalization would not produce the kind of prosperity he needed to keep power; it seemed superior to this to keep private control of assets by his favorites. In Putin's Russia he did not find a fair partner to his geopolitical ideas. He wanted to reunite Transnistria by subordinating it to his reign. When in the fall of 2003 he was willing to give major concessions to Russia, it ran aground due to the combined effects of the simultaneous Georgian Rose Revolution and massive nationalistic protests in Chisinau. 9 The Communist Voronin then changed geopolitical course and turned European. However, he was unwilling to reform Moldova in the way that would be compatible with rapid European integration -which otherwise could have happened,
given that from 2007 it had a major advocate in Brussels, once Romania joined the European Union. Voronin was profoundly "Moldovanist," and he did not want subordination to Romania. Culturally, he was still closer to Russia. His European turn was half-hearted and his eventual reforms timid.
Ukraine did not succeed, either, in getting out of the kind of oligarchic order that it gradually had slid into during the Kuchma years. After the 1998 crisis, in order to please the international donors, particularly the IMF, Kuchma nominated Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister who earlier was responsible, as the governor of the central bank, for the successful introduction of the national currency, the hryvnia, and for a similarly 8 A theoretical interpretation of patronal politics in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) space can be found Hale, 2015. 9 For a very detailed descriptuon of this dramatic event see Hill, 2012. Given that in all the CIS countries, with the exception of Georgia, 11 a kind of patronal or mafia state has prevailed over the last quarter of a century, it is a legitimate question to ask if the failure of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko team was a structural inevitability, or if there really was a different path to take?
Why so hard to reform?
Georgia's example indicates that the kind of patronal state that worked in Ukraine as well as in Georgia can be reformed. Moreover, the Georgian reforms happened in front of the Ukrainians since the Ukrainian revolution followed the one in Georgia a year later. Also, the international community made available considerable expertise to support reforms.
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Thus, there was an opportunity to overcome the inertia of oligarchic politics. The fact that this did not happen is due to several factors. First, the incoming Prime Minister, Yulia
Tymoshenko, was the kind of populist who did not believe that liberalizing reforms can be popular. While she initiated a transparent re-run on the privatization of the giant steel combine Kryvorizhstal, she also applied the kind of anti-market populism, e.g. in price
controls, that the Saakashvili government never contemplated, let alone implemented.
Second, the President played a laid-back role at first, and only then tried to undermine his inadequate but politically very skillful Prime Minister. This fatally weakened the reformist coalition and gave a new breath of life to the Donbass team, with, incredibly, the discredited Yanukovich at its helm. In Georgia, leadership was crucial to the breakthrough reforms while it was totally absent, surprisingly and disappointingly, in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Third, in Georgia there was an adequate combination of ideologies for a breakthrough reform: Saakashvili addressed corruption with a genuine determination. He combined this with a libertarian approach to the state that in the circumstances was adequate as it is much easier to fight corruption in a reduced, deregulated state than in a large, redistributive one that Ukraine had been -and remained, under Tymoshenko's populist drive. Forth, Ukraine is a large country with a much larger and more powerful oligarchic class than Georgia's, and also more important for Russia.
Thus the system's inertial force is stronger than in Georgia. Nevertheless, if similar determination and reformist intelligence would have been in place, Ukraine could have turned the corner. However it did not, and the split post-revolution camp gave a renewed chance to Yanukovich and his Donbass-gang to regain power. was not primarily of economic origin but had its roots in constrained freedoms.
Unlike in Ukraine, in Moldova the European Union had a very large, at the time almost infinite leverage. It is a small country and its EU neighbor, Romania, pays special attention to it. Yet, this leverage was not used adequately -in fact it was wasted. The fundamental problem with the EU's approach was that it did not apply strict expectations, or conditionalities. The emerging coalition used the EU banner but it also misused it. The first test of the application of the rule-of-law was the election of the president. The This triggered a slippery slope whereby the ruling coalition pretended that it did the "right things" while the EU tried to convince the member states that Moldova "deserved" the associate status, along with free trade and visa free travel. The confusion was multiple: first, it is wrong that visa free travel for citizens should depend to such an extent on the rulers' behavior when it is in fact a reward for citizens. Second, conditions in Moldova did not deteriorate all of a sudden in 2013 -instead, in the previous period, a lax conditionality regime of the EU (and to some extent the US) allowed the systemic evolution of the country to degenerate. A disciplined approach from the EU would have resulted in better systemic evolution in Moldova. Moldova still declares its allegiance to Europe. However, its leaders and society will have to play out if the country is going to move towards establishing the rule-of-law.
In the opposite case, its conflict with the EU over the absence of serious reforms may push the country towards Russia over time. has not yet been any noticeable breakthrough. In a situation of a lack of energetic reform leadership -and Ukraine after 2014 certainly qualifies in this respect -it is inherently difficult for foreigners to apply conditionality effectively. There is always plenty of tricks that can be applied to duck conditionalities. timing is free of politics -on the contrary, they are purely political -some highly visible cases could become deterrents for further corruption and can also deliver a certain feelgood factor to the population that has become very apathic towards politics overall. In the case of Moldova, after 2009 the EU had the leverage to seal a long-term geopolitical alliance through systemic reforms. Neither the technical know-how nor the political skills were present in the EU for this, however.
Summary
From 2014 the EU has been, together with the US, better allies in change in
Ukraine as well as in Moldova. Now, however, the overall international circumstances make exerting this influence more difficult for a much weakened Western alliance. Still, with the right skills and determination, this battle can be won -also for the benefit of a more stable and peaceful international order. Particularly Ukraine's future trajectory will have a critical influence over the international order.
